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Abstract—Decentralised random number generation algo-
rithms suffer from the Last Actor Problem, in which the last
participant to reveal their share can manipulate the generated
random value by withholding their share. This paper proposes
an encrypted share threshold scheme which prevents this attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, decentralised random number generation al-
gorithms have used a commit-reveal process in which par-
ticipants submit a commitment to their randomly generated
share. Once all participants have submitted commitments, each
participant reveals their share. The shares are combined using
a deterministic algorithm to produce the generated random
value. The last participant to reveal their share, known as
the Last Actor, can view all of the other shares. They can
determine the impact of revealing their share, and thus decide
to reveal their share or withhold their share, thus influencing
the generated random value.
DFINITY defined a Decentralised Random Beacon [1]
using a threshold scheme and BLS Signatures to prevent
the Last Actor Problem. Inspired by their work, the scheme
described in this paper uses the Shamir Threshold Scheme
[2] combined with modulo addition to provide a decentralised
random number generation scheme. This scheme is similar in
some aspects to the scheme recently proposed by Drake [3].
II. BACKGROUND
In Shamir’s Threshold Scheme random coefficients are
generated for an equation of the form shown below, where
the value a0 is the secret value.
Y (x) = a0 + a1.X + a2.X
2 + ...+ am−1.X
m−1modP
n shares are generated. Any m shares can be used to
calculate the y value for any x value. As such, the a0 secret
value can be constructed from any m shares.
III. ALGORITHM
Set-up: Deploy a smart contract to the blockchain to manage
the random number generation process.
Registration: The x value for each participant is the partici-
pant’s Ethereum address modP . Each participant generates an
ephemeral RSA or ECC encryption key pair. To register, they
publish their public key to the contract. The act of publishing
their public key publicises their Ethereum address and hence
their x value.
Calculate Random Coefficients: All participants generate
m − 1 random coefficients for an equation in the range 1 to
P − 1. They calculate the y values for each of the participant
x values.
Post Commitment: All participants post to the contract the
message digest of the y values for each of the participant
x values. Any participant which does not post commitment
values drops out of the random number generation process
and is fined.
Post Encrypted Y values All participants post to the con-
tract the encrypted y values for each of the participant x
values, encrypted against the public keys of each other partici-
pant. Any participant which does not post all of the encrypted
y values drops out of the random number generation process
and is fined.
Post Private Keys and Calculate Random All participants
post their private decryption keys. The contract then has
enough information to calculate the random value and check
for correctness. Correctness can be checked for by decrypting
the encrypted y values, checking commitments, and checking
that the order of the curve that each entity posted is m − 1.
The random value is calculated as the sum of the a0 values
modP .
To save gas, all participants post the plain text values for all
of the encrypted y values. All participant can off-chain check
the decryptions, commitments, and order of equations. If an
incorrect value is detected, this could be indicated by a call
to the contract, with the contract verifying the bad value and
fining the participant.
IV. PROPERTIES
Using commitments and asymmetrically encrypting the y
values means that individual attackers have to commit to a
single value and can not control the release of the information.
Each participant holds their own private key and publishes it
once all of the encrypted y values are posted, thus releasing
the information for all parties to see.
V. ATTACKS
If m attackers collude they can decrypt the encrypted y
values as they are posted. The m attackers could wait for the
other n−m sets of encrypted y values to be posted, and then
choose one or more attackers to withhold their private key, thus
affecting the generated random value. The random generation
process could be stopped by n−m+1 attackers not publishing
their private keys. Doing this would mean that at least m sets
of y values can not decrypted, and hence the a0 values can
not be interpolated. Both of these attacks can be countered by
fining participants who do not obey the algorithm.
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